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In Ethics After Babel* Jeffrey Stout has advanced and defended 
two interrelated theses: first, that Davidsonian insights effectively subdue 
many forms of ethical relativism, second, that if relativism, skepticism, and 
nihilism are effectively dissolved by semantic holism, then the possibility, 
announced by communitarians such as Bellah and Maclntyre, that liberal 
individualism might lack any resources to sustain rational moral discourse 
is, at best, overstated, and at worst, unintelligible. In this essay I shall 
argue that although Stout's analyses of conceptual and alethic relativism 
are largely correct, they do not support his conviction that "liberal 
modernity" is a sociological fiction. On the contrary, it is only because 
relativism has been transcended in the work of such philosophers as 
Davidson, Gadamer, Rorty, and Stout himself, that one can see why 
intractable moral and political dispute is so much a part of contemporary 
social life. 
Stout's allusion to Babel is largely deflationary: he believes that 
the mere facts of fundamental moral disagreement and conceptual 
diversity do not automatically cement the cases of moral skeptics, nihilists, 
or relativists. He invites us to view the debate between ethical universalists 
and their adversaries as bedeviled by a misleading either/or. 
Universalistic moral epistemologists, such as Gewirth and Donagan, as 
well as relativists such as Wong and Harman, confront us with the option 
of construing morality either as accessible to pure practical reason as 
such, or as irreducibly particularized and unique. There is reason to 
suspect, Stout argues, that this taken-for-granted dichotomy is 
theoretically and practically unsupportable. 
' Stout's via media between universalism and particularism draws 
heavily upon the work of Donald Davidson, who, in Inquiries into Truth 
and Interpretation?- established two important semantic truths. First, the 
idea of a conceptual framework or grid which either organizes or conforms 
to some preconceptual content is vacuous: that content is either 
specifiable and determinate, in which case it is not preconceptual, or it is 
not specifiable or determinate, and thus one is given no good reason to 
believe in it. Here Davidson simply updates and gives an analytic twist to 
Hegel's dismissal of Kant's ding-an-sich as both unintelligible and 
superfluous. Second, and more importantly, Davidson reveals the 
1 Beacon Press: Boston, 1988. 
2 The Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1984. 
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absurdity of "radically incommensurable conceptual schemes," conceived 
as mutually untranslatable languages. Entire languages which supposedly 
share no meanings in common can express no common beliefs, which 
neatly evades the issue of why one would choose to understand such 
collections of physical and acoustic tokens as languages. If beliefs about a 
given meaningful term in an alien language differ en masse from those 
attaching to its cognate in one's native language, wisdom would dictate not 
the ascription of "radically incommensurable" meanings or totally 
discrepant beliefs to speakers of the alien tongue but the revision of one's 
translation manuals, for what one singles out as the cognate term is simply 
not what is meant by the aliens, and thus cannot be a genuine cognate 3 
Thus it flies in the face of interpretive charity to impute massive 
disagreement between languages in any truth-conditional theory of 
meaning, where meaning is determined by the distribution of beliefs 
expressed in T-sentences. Relativists, however, to the extent that they 
deny the possibility of transcultural and/or translinguistic judgments, 
must insist upon the possibility of the "total occlusion" of beliefs and 
meanings between different cultures, societies, and cognitive systems. 
Insofar as this cannot be reconciled to the most basic demands of radical 
translation, the relativist lacks even the most rudimentary case to refute. 
The sheer existence of conceptual diversity and conflict of beliefs does not 
of itself make relativism theoretically attractive, and does not preclude the 
possibility of the practical resolution, through what Stout calls 
"hermeneutic enrichment" or moral "bricolage," of whatever epistemic 
conflicts or conceptual inadequacies that might arise.* 
Davidsonian holism is important in another respect, Stout argues: 
it throws into question a number of the constants that have haunted the 
debate between Liberals and Communitarians. Stout relies upon Rorty's 
description of "philosophical liberals" as those for whom the priority of 
right over good, or procedure over substantive visions of the good, is a 
matter of universal principle discovered and justified by an adequate 
moral epistemology 5 Insofar as this is foundationalism applied to politics, 
it stands under the shadows cast by the Davidsonian and Gadamerian 
holism which Stout uses to such advantage against moral relativism. 
But communitarians use another tactic against liberal society and 
politics, one which draws upon holistic arguments similar to those used by 
Stout in his polemic against relativism. If moral meanings and beliefs are 
3 "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Schemen, in Inquiries, pp. 183-98. See 
also Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 129-156. 
4 This is the topic of Chs. 1-4 of Stout's book. 
5 Richard Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism", in R. Hollinger, 
ed., Hermeneutics and Praxis (Notre Dame' Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 
1985), pp. 214-17. 
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holistically determined, then the foundationalist task of grounding moral 
convictions and judgments in explicit universal principles is as misguided 
as Cartesian epistemology, for essentially the same reasons. So any 
coherent community of moral agents must evince a substantial consensus 
about the nature of a humanly good life and its corresponding obligations. 
But liberal society, predicated as it is on the impossibility of such 
consensus and the undesirability of a politics based upon a shared vision 
of the good, prohibits such a consensus, or at least makes it politically and 
socially irrelevant, and in so doing robs the culture of any coherent moral 
discourse. Thus Alasdair Maclntyre argues that liberal society cannot be 
other than "civil war carried on by other means" and that its inception 
marked a catastrophic shattering of the theoretical and practical 
comprehension of morality; and Michael Sandel complains that it rests 
upon an impossible metaphysics of the self, prior to and unencumbered 
by its particular attributes, desires, or beliefs.^ 
Stout responds to the above by reaffirming the tenets of 
Davidsonian holism. // the idea of radically incommensurable conceptual 
schemes is incoherent, and if any two intertranslatable languages must 
therefore agree in large measure about what propositions are true, then 
the communitarian fear that rational moral discourse is stymied by liberal 
society's wild plurality of moral standpoints is quite misplaced. The 
predicament alleged by Maclntyre to embroil all modernity cannot be as 
dire as he insists, since no disagreement is a priori irresolvable, given the 
need for some shared common ground of belief between contending 
parties. And even if one party to a moral dispute lacks key moral terms or 
concepts available to her counterpart, she still has the option to 
incorporate—or reject—this alternative moral vocabulary through 
"hermeneutic enrichment" or "moral bricolage." Things cannot be 
hopeless in principle, as Maclntyre suggests.7 
Stout, in effect, coopts the communitarian critique by painting 
liberalism in communitarian colors: there is enough moral consensus 
within liberal social and political orders to sustain rational debate, and this 
consensus is not incompatible with liberal pluralism and neutralism. The 
consensus characteristic of liberalism is a "thin consensus," one based 
upon an army of platitudes and the well-entrenched Creole dialect of 
"human rights," which Stout believes travels well across many substan-
tively different conceptions of the good. The problems that do beset the 
liberal order—the corruption of practices by external goods such as money, 
status and power-are thus not unique to liberal society, nor are they 
caused by liberal theory or practice, nor are they insoluable on liberalism's 
6 Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame 
Press, 1981), p. 236; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982). 
7 See Ch. 9 of Ethics After Babel, passim. 
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own terms 8 The liberal modernity excoriated by communitarians such as 
Maclntyre, Sandel, Bellah, and Lasch, turns out to be a myth, inspired by a 
"terminal wistfulness" for an equally mythic social cohesiveness. 
II 
Stout's optimistic appraisal of liberal society is partly a product of 
the way in which he appropriates Davidson's Truth-conditional theory of 
meaning. Because Davidson has shown the Scheme/Content distinction 
to be untenable and has eliminated at least one version of "radical 
incommensurability" from the holist's lexicon, Stout surmises not only that 
the theoretical basis for relativism has been eroded, but that there is 
enough overlap between moral beliefs and enough resources for her-
meneutic enrichment to make the rational resolution of moral differences 
a human possibility. Yet Stout overinflates Davidson's actual 
achievement, and in doing so, does not recognize serious obstacles to 
achieving a meaningful moral consensus in the liberal order. 
Davidsonian translation is a technique of fixing meanings by 
mapping beliefs and cross-indexing them with an already-articulated 
system of beliefs-that which resides in one's own language. 'Truth" is 
taken as a logically primitive term in any language; and the principle of 
charity enjoins one to try to honor the fact that most of the target-
language's propositions will be true. Yet in actual linguistic practice, truth-
ascriptions are inextricable from verification and assertibility norms; truth-
ascriptions are embedded in historical and practical contexts of 
justification. The absence of such pragmatic concerns from truth-
conditional semantics leads one to question not its accuracy or coherence 
as a research program, but its adequacy and its sufficiency. For if the 
assignment of truth values to interpreted sentences is, at base, a practical 
task, one should acknowledge that the contours of one's practices have a 
bearing upon the truth value assigned.^ Davidson conspicuously fails to 
do this. Truth-conditional semantics is methodologically unconcerned 
with the actual practical contexts of belief. It begins with the assumption 
that since both languages in a T-theory cannot be in massive disharmony, 
one can assume that the task of understanding the target language is 
simply a matter of coordinating the beliefs it expresses with one's own 
language's key beliefs. Davidson thus leaves one with the impression that 
any given task of translation can be accomplished solely with the resources 
8 See Ch. 10 of Ethics After Babel, passim. 
9 See, g., Michael Dummett, Truth", in Truth and Other Enigmas 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978), and Charles Taylor, Theories of 
Meaning", in Human Agency and language: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985). 
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one's own singular language affords prior to the act of translating.*® He 
seems to claim not only that no language is untranslatable-in-principle, 
but that any language can be translated into any other as it may exist at 
any given moment. Furthermore, it is taken for granted by Davidson that 
the holistic background presupposed by a T-theory is likewise a network of 
explicit beliefs, and that any and all such beliefs can and will, as the T-
theory nears completion, be enumerated. Language is fundamentally a 
locus of belief for Davidson. 
This methodological fixation conceals a large and, I think, 
unexamined assumption: that interpreting a language can be understood 
adequately and exclusively on the model of determining explicit beliefs. 
This assumption has been explored and challenged by Hubert L. Dreyfus 
in "Holism and Hermeneutics.il 
Dreyfus begins by contrasting the theoretical holism of Quine, 
Davidson, Husserl, and Feyerabend with the practical holism of 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, and Polanyi. The former 
construe all understanding, whether that of text, persons, or alien cultures 
and disciplines, as 
....making a total theory about a total theory, that is, 
making a translation into your language of the theory 
implied in the other person's behavior or language... For 
Quine and Davidson all one needs in order to 
understand another culture or epoch is a theory that 
maximizes agreement as to which beliefs are true and 
which are false. The fact that these beliefs only make 
sense in a practical situation against a taken-for-granted 
cultural background seems to them to present no special 
problem, since on their view the background can itself be 
made the explicit object of some form of theoretical 
detached analysis revealing further beliefs.* 2 
10 For critiques of Davidson along these lines, see Hilary Putnam, 'Truth 
and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism", in 
M. Krausz, ed.. Relativism Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame: 
Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1989); Joseph Margolis, "Rationality and 
Realism", Ch. 4 of Pragmatism Without Foundations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), and 'Truth and Relativism" in Science Without Unity 
(Blackwell, 1987); Alasdair Maclntyre, Tradition and Translation", Ch. XIX 
of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988). 
11 In Hollinger, op. cit., pp. 227-48. 
12 Dreyfus, pp. 230-31. 
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Yet recent attempts to do precisely that (most notably, Husserl's 
Crisis and the formalist programs in Artificial Intelligence) have 
floundered within the vastness and indeterminacy of this non-formal 
cultural background.13 Husserl's verdict on Crisis style phenomenology, 
that its eidetic reductions constitute an "infinite task," amounts to an 
admission of failure, given his ambitions to set philosophy on the path of a 
strict science. If understanding can never be brought to some sort of rest, 
however temporary, nothing has been understood. And, Dreyfus suggests, 
this accounts for the nihilism that occasionally and unexpectedly crops up 
in theoretical holists confronted with the problems of the rationality and 
truth-value of coherent alternative theories: eg., Feyerabend's dismissal of 
the rational superiority of competing paradigms, or Derrida's celebration 
of textual "play" over interpretive seriousness.^4 
Practical holists avoid the problems of indeterminacy and 
nihilism by understanding interpretation as a practical, rather than a 
theoretical epistemological problem: 
...What makes up the (cultural] background is not 
beliefs, either explicit or implicit, but habits and customs, 
embodied in the sort of subtle skills which we exhibit in 
our everyday interactions with things and people... Thus 
our knowledge, even our attempts to know the 
background, is always already shaped by what might be 
called our implicit ontology, an "ontology which is in our 
practices as ways of behaving towards things and people, 
not in our minds as background assumptions which we 
happen to be taking for granted.*5 
Genuine understanding and criticism of that which is foreign to us 
thus cannot simply be a matter of charting beliefs and/or behavioral rules: 
According to the ontological hermeneutics of both 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein, when we understand 
another culture we come to share its know-how and 
13 Much of Dreyfus's recent work documents these failures. See his 
introduction to Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: 
M.I.T. Press, 1982); H. Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus, "Making a Mind Versus 
Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at Branchpoint" in S. 
Graubard, ed., The Artificial Intelligence Debate (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 
1988); and H. Dreyfus and J. Haugeland, "Husserl and Heidegger: 
Philosophy's Last Stand" in Michael Murray, ed., Heidegger and Modern 
Philosophy (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1978). 
1 4 Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics", pp. 228,242. 
15 Dreyfus, p. 232. 
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discriminations rather than arriving at agreement 
concerning which assumptions and beliefs are true. This 
coordination comes about not by making a translation, or 
cracking a code, but by prolonged everyday interaction; 
the result is not a commensuration of theories but what 
Heidegger calls "finding a footing" and Wittgenstein 
refers to as "finding one's way about."*** 
The context of agreement for radical translation, and by 
extension, for any effective rational argument, is not merely that of belief, 
nor can it be primarily that of belief. The "agreement in judgement" of 
which Wittgenstein speaks in the Philosophical Investigations*? is made 
possible against a background of skills and practices, which cannot' be 
exhaustively formalized as a system of explicit beliefs or formal rules 
without risking an infinite regress. To translate a language is to have 
already, in some unspecified sense, articulated a set of culturally-
incarnate intentions as a belief system, and this entails a prior, tacit grasp 
of shared aims and embodied skills—of Heidegger's Vorhaben and 
Wittgenstein's Lebensformen. 
Thus the task of reaching a rational consensus between speakers 
of these alternative languages, between partisans of different cultures, 
paradigms, or less-than-radically incommensurable conceptual schemes, 
is therefore contingent not only upon "the impossibility of massive 
(theoretical) error," but upon the extent and quality of this deeper practical 
agreement. The success or failure of any particular attempt at the rational 
resolution of conflict will reflect the extent and the nature of "agreement in 
judgement" between the parties to the debate. But neither theoretical nor 
practical holism eliminates the possibility that in certain specific cases, no 
genuinely rational consensus can be forged, because the beliefs in a given 
shared subject matter are too disparate, or too formal and indeterminate, 
and more significantly, because the practices whereby the heterogeneity 
of beliefs and meanings can be overcome are either nonexistent, feeble, or 
corrupted by ideology into mere simulacra of rational activities. How 
would one be able to determine when this is so? 
Ill 
One way would be to outline the conditions for the resolution of 
meaningful disagreements and the corresponding ways in which non-
meaningful disagreements—cases of "incommensurable moral 
vocabularies"-can be attenuated through the process of "hermeneutic 
16 Dreyfus, p. 235. 
17 Philosophical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1953), Pars. 241-42, pg. 
8 AUSLEGUNG 
enrichment."*8 L e t us for the moment assume a requisite "thin 
consensus" on moral platitudes in the social and political orders, and that 
this suffices to make most moral disagreements within that order 
meaningful, rather than merely verbal. The rational resolution of moral 
conflict would consist in a backwards appeal from those specific moral 
convictions to more general ones which can provide the former with more 
or less adequate rational support.* 9 The appeal which provides the most 
adequate support to a given moral position is the one which commands 
rational assent, and if no single appeal can be established as rationally 
superior, the debate proceeds until one is formulated. This sort of 
argumentation, insofar as it involves the synthesis of more general 
reasons-for-action in novel and ad hoc ways, is not strictly deductive but 
phronetic; nevertheless, the dispute is resolved by a process of 
commensuration rather than reformulated through hermeneutic 
enrichment.20 it takes place within the parameters of a single moral 
paradigm or vocabulary. 
It becomes clear to anyone who has participated in such disputes 
that principles of too great a generality cannot effectively help in resolving 
the moral disagreement. Were someone to refer to "One may not do evil 
to promote good" in order to condemn a specific act of indiscriminate 
political terrorism against an unjust regime, one might not accomplish 
much even if there was universal consensus both upon the truth-value of 
that sentence and its interpretation. For there may be massive disa-
greement about the application of this general principle to specific 
actions: one might retort "Killing those that passively support tyranny is 
not evil in the first place." Thus highly general moral maxims or beliefs, 
such as "promote in your actions the general welfare," "be courageous," 
"respect persons as ends-in-themselves," and "Slavery is wrong" serve the 
purpose of placing more particular moral convictions into some sort of 
intelligible, justifiable order, but they themselves provide no guidance for 
action except in the most extreme circumstances 21 
If meaningful moral disagreements are to be resolved, then 
either one must appeal to principles of some degree of specificity or the 
parties to the dispute must be able to take for granted certain inexplicit 
judgemental skills which would make the application of general norms 
unproblematic. The moral dispute could be settled if one could assume 
18 My distinction between "commensurable" vocabularies and those 
needing "hermeneutic" aid owes much to Richard Rorty, Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 315-56. 
1 9 Maclntyre, Whose Justice?, pp. 71-73. 
2 ° See Albert Jonson and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988), pp. 23-46. 
2* Stanley Hauerwas and Philip D. Renneson, "Flight from 
Foundationalism" (Unpublished Manuscript), pp. 14-15. 
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agreement upon a stock of relatively specific principles pertaining to the 
subject matter-principles such as "abortions after the 1st trimester of 
pregnancy are always prima facie wrong" or "Military strategies that rest 
upon systematically harming noncombatants are inconsistent with the 
virtues of justice and courage." Such principles do not deductively 
determine what is to be done in all circumstances; since they are not rules 
which determine judgement in all cases, but determinate rules which 
guide judgement of a kind of case, I shall dub them "middle-level 
principles," and a loose-but-substantial consensus on them "middle-level 
agreement." 
In the absence of explicit "middle-level agreement," disputes can 
be resolved through "agreement in judgement," i.e., through the 
nonformalizable phronetic "background skills which Dreyfus claims 
undergird all "agreement in opinions." One can pass directly from an 
understanding of a moral rule, norm, or virtue to its noncontroversial 
application in a given case, because one can assume a certain 
standardization in the judgemental skills of others. Only when this fails, 
when has no recourse to either "middle-level principles" or "agreement in 
judgement" can one conclude that the problem of resolving the dispute 
has become hermeneutic, a case of "incommensurable" vocabularies that 
are not in "meaningful" discord. 
To take a disagreement as an occasion for "hermeneutics" one 
must be able to view the competing moral party as endorsing a rival 
system of concepts, descriptions, and beliefs, allegiance to which 
precludes allegiance to one's own system.22 in the process of 
hermeneutically "finding a footing" with the alien vocabulary-of acquiring 
it as a "second first language" in Alasdair Maclntyre's w o r d s 2 3 - w e may 
find that it complements rather than challenges our own moral language, 
and thus "enriches" our own moral discourse with its descriptions and 
"candidates for truth and falsity." On the other hand, we might determine 
it to be genuinely incompatible, whereupon we need to compare the 
adequacy of the rival vocabulary in reference to the manifest inadequacies 
of our own, and vice-versa. Rorty, Kuhn, and Bernstein have all claimed 
this hermeneutic process of comparative-evaluation-without-
commensuration for the history of the sciences, and Maclntyre has argued 
that its narrative dimensions—i.e., it's ability to recount the displacement of 
one body of theory by another—allow for objective judgments about the 
relative rational worth of incommensurable scientific paradigms. Unless 
some version of the fact/value dichotomy is true-and like Stout, I see no 
22 Cf. Maclntyre, Whose Justice?, Ch. XVIII. 
23 Ibid., p. 394. 
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reason to affirm it—the same sort of hermeneutic process of comparison, 
incorporation, rejection, and/or replacement holds for ethical discourse.24 
IV 
Return now to Stout's claims concerning the "thin" Davidsonian 
consensus present in liberal individualist society. Stout characterizes this 
consensus in terms of widely agreed-upon moral platitudes, and the moral 
creole-dialect of human rights. Yet if platitudes or rights are to be the 
objects of justificatory appeal in a moral dispute, one should be able to 
assume either a) a degree of material specificity to them, b) a shared, 
provisionally fixed interpretation of them, or c) shared phronetic skills to 
govern their application. Yet each of these conditions is rendered 
problematic by liberalism itself, insofar as it remains committed to 
neutrality on the issue of the good as such and in middle-level detail for 
human beings. 
For example, Stout's paradigm cases o.f platitudes-e.g., "Slavery is 
wrong"—are profoundly abstract. Insofar as "agreement" on such 
propositions is "thin" and minimal, the interpretation of its constituent 
terms remains unsettled (what does one mean by "slavery"?), and the 
question of its proper application is evaded (is this a case of slavery?). That 
this is true of much political discourse in liberal individualist societies is 
manifested by disputes over rights, which seldom are about the existence 
of specific rights, such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but over 
their range, scope, content, and application.25 If the parameters of a 
debate are extremely general notions, such as Stout's platitudes and 
rights, they are adequate to get debate started, but not sufficient to resolve 
it, unless more specific notions are introduced, or matters of interpretation 
are settled, or casuistic technai are concocted in the meantime. Without 
such developments, the parties to such disputes share little more than a 
rhetorical style. 
24 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, pp. 315-56; Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), esp. part 2; 
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the 
Philosophy of Science", in G. Gutting, ed., Paradigms and Revolutions 
(Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1980). 
25 For parallel views on the language of rights, see Christopher Lasch, T h e 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism", in C. Reynolds and R. Norman, 
eds., Community in America (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988), 
and Sheldon Wolin, "Revolutionary Action Today", in J. Rajchman and C. 
West, eds., Post-Analytic Philosophy (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
1985). 
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In Stout's defense it could always be argued that the afore-
mentioned problems of interpretation and application need not be solved 
anterior to any dispute: they may emerge during the course of debate, 
through processes of "hermeneutic enrichment" rather than rational 
commensuration. This is true but, from the standpoint of liberal 
modernity, irrelevant. For "hermeneutic enrichment" to be a mode of 
rational conflict-resolution, a certain sort of attitude must prevail among 
potential disputants: a willingness to see serious disagreement settled by 
rational argument, which requires both a commitment to one's own moral 
standpoint as true and a willingness to let the convictions proper to that 
standpoint be challenged by other, incompatible and competing 
convictions.26 For participants in such conflicts, the deliverances of 
rational argument are decisive: after alternative moral systems have been 
understood and appropriated, one's final allegiance rests with that system 
which has established itself, through argumentative inquiry, as the best to 
have emerged thus far. But liberal social orders are predicated on the 
idea that judgments about the best emergent system of moral belief and 
practice—judgements which will bank upon middle-level agreements— 
cannot and should not be settled, definitively or provisionally. Ronald 
Dworkin has defined liberalism as the belief that justice is independent of 
any conception of the good life: justice is formal and procedural, setting 
the universal terms for conducting disputes in abstraction from the subject 
matter of such disputes.?? In such a social and political climate, it is 
difficult to see how practices and institutions saddled with the 
responsibility of forming agents and/or citizens who wish their actions to 
be informed by the best possible reasons can flourish. The liberal social 
and political order systematically undercuts those tendencies that might 
provide fertile ground for limited moral agreement 28 Davidsonian con-
sensus and hermeneutic enrichment exist in the liberal order as formal, 
but not real possibilities. 
My disagreement with Stout, then, is largely an empirical one. 
Davidson's quasi-transcendental argument establishes that no two 
linguistic communities can disagree on everything yet still both be 
identifiable as linguistic; the hermeneutic tradition advanced by Gadamer 
explodes the "myth of the framework" which equates incommensurability 
with incomprehensibility. But these a priori observations, even if they are 
26 Alasdair Maclntyre, "Relativism, Power, and Philosophy", in K. Baynes, 
J. Bohman, and T. McCarthy, eds.. After Philosophy (Cambridge: M.I.T. 
Press, 1986), pp. 408-409. 
27 Ronald Dworkin, "Philosophy and Politics", in Bryan Magee, ed.. Men of 
Ideas (New York: Viking, 1978), p. 259. 
28 Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame: Univ. 
of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 72-86; Barry Schwartz, The Battle for 
Human Nature (New York: Norton, 1987), pp. 245-80. 
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sound, do not ensure that every social and political order can sustain a 
significant rational agreement on moral matters, and they certainly do not 
ensure this consequence for individualistic liberalism. Whether they 
contingently do or not is a matter for detailed investigation; then let the 
sociological or historical chips fall where they may. 
Stout is not starry-eyed about the liberal order in its present state: 
his critique of contemporary society in many ways parallels that of 
communitarians:29 
I have not demonstrated that our linguistic ecosystem is 
viable. Even if we do have sufficient agreement and 
conceptual wherewithal to support rational moral 
discourse we could still be too vicious and our institutions 
too corrupted to live well (p. 219) 
The idea that liberal society lacks any shared conception 
of the good is false, but this doesn't mean all is well. It 
could still be the case that politics, as the social practice 
of self-governance directed toward the common good, 
has begun to give way to merely bureaucratic 
management of competition for external goods, (p. 291) 
But Stout persists in thinking that none of this is endemic to 
liberalism perse. He sees "corruption," the displacement of goods 
internal to practices by the external goods supplied by institutions, as a 
challenge which can be adequately surmounted by thin, Davidsonian 
consensus and the conceptual enhancements of effective hermeneutic 
consciousness. But if I am correct in insisting upon substantial "middle-
level" agreement as a condition for peaceful conflict-resolution, and 
Dreyfus is correct in viewing understanding as always involving the 
acquisition of nonformalizable skills through apprenticeship and training, 
then Stout leaves liberal society without two indispensable tools for solving 
its crisis: action-guiding premises for practical reasoning, and virtuous and 
discriminating agents for whom the dictates of practical reasoning carry 
weight 
A full account of the poverty of liberalism in this respect has yet to 
be written. Let two highly anecdotal examples suffice for the moment. In 
Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers^® Robert Jackall 
sketches a picture of a Weberian enclave where the rules which guide 
individual conduct within the organization differ radically from those 
which apply to home and hearth. The key maxim of many of Jackall's 
managers seems to be "Please the boss at all costs." The distinctions 
29 Stout, pp. 231-32,266-92. 
30 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
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between pleasing and doing well for someone, as well as those between 
being good at one's profession and seeming good to one whose decisions 
can further one's fortunes, disappear for them. 3* It follows that for Jackall's 
managers qua managers the divide between internal and external goods 
has not softened, with the latter impinging upon the former; internal goods 
are unintelligible in such a context, except as rhetorical gobbledygook.32 
Yet if significant sectors of liberal society, imbued with the managerial 
ethos liberalism nourishes, forswear internal goods altogether, there is 
very little point in speaking of moral virtues or duties in those contexts: 
what ends internal to what practices could they serve? If Jackall's picture of 
management is even remotely accurate, the task facing liberalism is not 
the reinvigoration of practices in corporations, but acknowledging their 
disappearance. And how, apart from challenging liberal middle-level 
neutrality and proceduralism, can such practices be inserted into a 
Goffmanesque parade of manipulation and counter-manipulation? 
Another example: Barry Sussman, in What Americans Really 
Think^ argues that most Americans have not forsworn the precepts of the 
old, post-New Deal welfare liberal coalition for Ronald Reagan's even 
older economic liberalism. They remain committed to a decent social 
minimum. Social Security, the accountability of government to the 
governed in foreign and domestic policy, and "no more Viet nam s." 3 4 
Sussman supports these claims by a detailed analysis of public opinion 
polls; he is himself a reputable public opinion analyst and pollster. Yet, 
despite the overwhelming evidence he cites to show that Reagan has not 
commanded anything approaching an ideological mandate, his polls 
consistently reveal that people will vote their economic interests whatever 
their corresponding ideological convictions about justice or the common 
good. Voting one's pocketbook is a constant across class, ideological, and 
party lines.35 if ] r e a < j - Sussman correctly, his research poses a 
31 Q.v. Jackall, pp 19-20. "{BJureaucratic work causes people to bracket, 
while at work, the moralities that they might hold outside the workplace or 
that they might adhere to privately and to follow instead the prevailing 
morality of their particular organizational situation. As a former vice-
president of a large firm says: 'What is right in the corporation is not what 
is right in a man's home or in his church. What is right in the corporation 
is what the guy above you wants from you. That's what morality is in the 
corporation'" (p. 6). 
32 Cf. Maclntyre, After Virtue, Ch. 3. 
33 New York: Pantheon, 1988. 
34 Sussman, Part Three, passim. 
35 Sussman, pp. 206-220. See especially the chart on p. 218 which 
documents the tendencies among many voters to vote for Reagan on self-
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considerable problem to Stout, insofar as Stout believes that the liberal 
polity possesses resources for transforming its institutions in a direction 
more hospitable to practices. This would minimally require a citizenry 
prepared to act on its own basic moral convictions, a citizenry for whom the 
deliverances of practical reasoning are decisive. Sussman's citizens, 
though they have "strong" convictions, characteristically abandon them 
when individual economic interests dictate. Yet for moral reason to be 
effective, for Davidsonian consensus, hermeneutic enrichment, and 
middle-level agreement to make a real difference, such convictions, 
however "strong," need to be more than notional. It may very well be the 
case that their ephemerality indicates a distinct lack of determinate 
middle-level content-that, in effect, much of what passes for heartfelt 
political belief in contemporary America is merely platitudinous. This too 
seriously compromises the optimism which permeates Stout's moral 
epistemology. 
I reiterate: the examples above are anecdotal, a mere preface to 
an issue to be settled by far more detailed empirical analyses. But it is an 
empirical issue and a philosophically important one at that: whether or not 
modern liberal individualism and its various progeny can actually sustain 
the moral coherence that Stout and others grant to them in theory. 
Stout contends that liberal society can, in principle, be other than 
it is. But it is not ultimately philosophical principle that will effect this sort 
of change: it is character. Whether modernity has a reserve of persons of 
good character, whether modernity in fact tends to undermine good 
character by making it fit awkwardly if at all within its dominant institu-
tions, are questions slighted by Stout in Ethics After Babel, but 
nevertheless the questions that need to be acknowledged and answered if 
liberalism is to receive an adequate rational defense.3 6 
interested economic grounds even when they believed that Mondale's 
policies were more equitable and prudent. 
36 Special thanks must go to my colleagues Stephan T. Mayo, James 
Montmarquet, and Barbara Taranto, who read and commented upon this 
essay. An earlier version was presented at the Eastern Division meeting of 
the A.P.A., 28 December 1989, in Atlanta, Ga. 
